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Kimio Takanaka* 
Introduction 
A steady sequence of upheavals in international economic relations has continued 
since the 1970s. The fixed exchange rate system, established in Bretton Woods in 1948. 
was inevitably abandoned in favor of a managed float system in 1971. A booming 
international capital market has not only forged new links among financial centers of 
the world, but also raised new unease about international financial stability. Newly 
industrializing economies (NIEs) have seized an important share of exports in manufac-
tured goods in the world market from the developed economies. Most recently, macro-
economic imbalances, combined with structural shifts in trade patterns, have generated 
political pressures that gravely threaten the open international trading system, a system 
built up sοpainstakingly after World War IL 
Economists often refer tゅ tradebarriers as administered protection, because these 
barriers typically do not imply legislative enactment of each act of protection. The 
e玄pansivetrend in world trade resulting from declining tariffs was rudely interrupted 
in the middle of 1970s. An offsetting growth in these trade barriers followed. With 
these resp巴ctto negotiated tariff reductions, continued in GATT negotiations, their 
incremental effect in loosening the restraints on the world trading system was seriously 
compromised by the growth of non-tariff barriers (NTBs〕. These restrictions are 
customarily applied through institutions and processes set up to regulate imports, 
including the exercise of political power by the executive branch in making trade-
restraining arrange泣ientswith other countries. 
Non-tariff barrers can be classified into two different categories with wholly different 
implications. One type of barrier is that which bypasses GATT’s rule of law ; the other 
type of barrier is that which acknowledges the rule but pervert it. The former type 
consists of“high-track川＞ restraints on exports by trading partners ; the latter type 
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consists of“low-track”restraints, such as countervailing duties and anti-dumping pro-
v1s1ons. 
Recent trade friction has generated various types of bilateral and multilateral negotia-
tions. In order to establish an international economic order, one that would promote 
mutual development through trade and investment, it is the most important to theoretically 
analyze the points of friction and suggest a clear-cut direction for policy implementation. 
The purpose of this research is to d巴rivenew implications from the existing theories 
-0f free and fair trade. The persistent trade disputes between the United States and 
Japan have aroused a debate over the issue of free trade verses fair trade in both the 
policy ar巴naand the academia. However, there has not yet been a thorough discussion 
・comparing the two contrasting notions. In this research, I will clarify the relationship 
between the notions of free trade and fair trade, compare the merits and demerits of 
each, and propose an alternative, economically desirable policy. 
I will define free trade as a theory or an argument which focuses on the benefit 
arising from the free movement of goods and services due to the differences of factor 
endowments, and calls for the minimization of the impediments against fr巴emovement 
-0f goods and services across borders in order to achieve a maximization of gains among 
al countries involved. Fair trade, on the other hand, will be defined as a theory or 
an argument justifying calls for fairness in terms of opportunity, capability and outcome 
among al countries involved in trade. 
The content of my argument will be based on the equilibrium and partial equilibrium 
・chart that are often used for analysis on gains from trade. The existing studies of trade 
has been primarily static in its analysis and explanation (in other words, a static 
explanation was applied to a static result). In this research, I will attempt to conduct 
a dynamic analysis and explanation, and to derive new implications. I will also inquire 
into its policy implications. 
I . Free Trade and Gains from Trade 
1. New Theoretical Approach to Free Trade Theory 
The Ricardian approach (focusing on comparative cost of produced goods, etc.) has 
been the basic approach to the theory of free trade for・ along time. In this paper, 
however, since a minutely constructed traditional trade theory is very static, We consi-
der consumption economic trade theory2) where trade is defined by consumer preferences 
in the two countries and their demand司 function.
This proposition has a lot of value, and it suggests the ,following important political 
implications: (1) All gains from trade will raise the level of welfare for th巴consumers;
(2) trade regarding the comparative cost of produced goods increases the total welfare 
2) Professor Kiyoshi Kojima used this term in his articles (Kiyoshi Kojima，“Kokusai Boeki 
Toshi-ron", Inteγnational Economic Review, No. 4-5, 1979 ; Kiyoshi Kojima，“Kako Boeki-gata 
Keizai Hatten Model”， International Economic Review, No. 10-11, 1979). 







of the consumers of countries involved in trade ; and (3) free trade maximizes consumer 
welfare compared to the situation in which tariff and other artificial impediments e玄ist.
These propositions together constitute the core of the free trade principle and these al 
involve universal propriety in so far as produced goods are concerned. First, we should 
rightly evaluate the free trade principle. 
However, the request for protected trade comes from supply-side economics. Accordi-
ng to this position, the kind of good that a country produces and the way of producing 
the good are important. Free trade principleand the request for protected trade belong 
to different dimensions. Therefore, free trade principle accomplishes universal propriety 
independently. 
2. Pure Exchange Model 
Chart-1 indicates a pure-exchange-model with an offer-curve. It is hypothesized here 
that one country which places its primary point at point-0 holds a volume OC of good-
X and a volume OF of good-Y. Each country faces the international market and has 
trade r巴lationswith a foreign country whose volume of goods, value of utility and 
comparative prices are different. One country exports a volume ED of good-X and 
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shifts from I to II and consumer welfare increases. 
x x 
Pure exchange is defined as a rearrangement of goods in stock. This definition does 
not include changes in production. This model offers an important conclusion to the 
debate over the essence of gains from trade. That is to say, trade profit means consu-
mer profit and the increasing of welfare through rearrangement of goods in stock. 
Consumer profit is provided through the import of cheaper and increased amount of 
foreign goods. In short, gains from trade can be explained as "gains from import.” 
Since the export of goods decreases the availability of consumption goods and reduces 
welfare, export in itself is not a source of trade profit. This conclusion contradicts the 
opinion that importing is a“loss”and exporting is a“gain”in recent trade negotiations. 
Furthermore, according to this model, we can understand that trade equilibrium in a 
pure exchange is determined by consumer taste, which is explained by the demand func-
tion. Therefore, we can understand that traditional trade theory must be a“consumption 
economic trade theory.”Even when trade is accompanied by production adjustment, the 
situation is essentially the same. This is explained in the next section. 
3. Gains from Trade in the Case of Trade Accompanied by Production Adjustment 
Chart-2 shows the case of trade accompani巴dby production adjustment in the beginning: 
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of trade. (1) The production point shifts from P to P' on HH (production-frontier)-
curve (production adjustment or specialization), (2) the consumption point shifts from 
P to C (consumption adjustment) and (3) by exporting a volume JP’of good-X, and 
by importing a volume JC of good-Y, trade is balanced. In accordance with (1), (2) 
and (3), (4) indifference-curve shifts from U0 to U2 (consumer-welfare is increased 
by a large margin〕.This is the gain from trade in case of trade accompanied by pro・
duction adjustment. 
On chart』 2,the pure-exchange-model can be explained as consumer welfare rising 
on the indifferenc←curve from U。toU1 by producing goods at P and consuming them 
at C'. Therefore, when trade is accompanied by production adjustment, it means that 
consumer-welfare is further increased on the indifference-curve from U1 to U2. This is 
usually called “gains from sp巴cializ瓜ion"and differs from “gainョfromexchange" that 
are introduced by pure-exchange-model.“Gains from exchange" create consumer profits. 
Therefore we should focus on the nature of the “gain from specialization.” 
“Production-frontier”is the locus of a combination of optimum output of two goods, 
when production factors (labour and capital) are the most efficiently (satisfying Pareto-
optimality) allocated to producing two goods, and full-employment is maintained. There-
fore, point P and P’on HH-curve 〔production-frontier)are“indifferent.”If this 
“indifference”means no gain and no los, it means~ that the process of production 
adjustment from P to P' does not produce any gain for production-side. 
In short, when production adjustment accompanies the beginning of trade, more profit 
from trade is gained than the case of pure-exchange-model. However, production adjust-
ment does not produce any profit for production-side, but only increases consumer-
welfare. Therefore, al gains from trade result in“profit”on the consumption-side. In 
sum, traditional trade theory incorporates production adjustment and gives consideration 
to the production-side, stil, this is essentially a“consumption economic trade theory.” 
Furthermore, as long as trade is indifferent to the production-side, free trade alw旦ys
increases consumer-welfare, not only in case of pure exchange, but also in the case 
where production adjustment is includ巴d.The legitimacy of the free trade principle 
and its universal propriety are thus demonstrated. 
Il. Economic Analysis on Fair Trade 
1. The Friction in Production Adjustment 
Foundation of Protected Trade 
In terms of produced goods, free trade is supported by the former argument and the 
consumption economic trade theorylbecause free trade always increases consumer welfare. 
However the calls for prot巴ctedtrade comes from production (supply)-side. The major 
reason for advocating anti-free trade is the friction, it causes through the production 
acijustment (specialization) process. The interests of consumers who gain large gains 
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difficulty and loss that producers (corporations and their workers) face are visible and 
seem urgent. Th巴sefactors drive people to protected trade. In the next section, I will 
explain the fallacy of protected trade3>. 
Partial Equilibrium Analysis 
When dealing with the case of conflict over the gain and loss of consumers versus 
producers, one usually uses a partial equilibrium chart inst問 dof a gen巴ralequilibrium 
chart. This is because the explanation is complicated if vve use a general equilibrium 
chart for that case. Since a partial equilibrium chrat is drawn without confirming 
accurate relations corresponding to a general equilibrium chart, the conclusion is likely 
to support anti-free trade. Therefore, in this section, we shall firstly deal with the 
3〕Comparativearguments between free trade and fair trade are offered the following articles ; 
1) William R. Cline，“Imports and Consum巴rPrice : A Survey Analysis，” journal of Retail-
ing, 1979. 
2) W.R. Cline, The Future of World Trade in Textiles and Apparel, Institute for Interna-
tional Economics, 1987, Revised 1990. 
3) Robert E. Scott and Thea M. Lee, Reconsidering the Benefits and Costs of T1’ade Pγotec-
tion: The Case of Textiles and Apparel, Workig Paper No. 105, Economic Policy Institute, 
April 1991. 
Theoretical Debate on Free Trade and Fair Trade 43 
relationship between a partial-equilibrium-chart and a general equilibrium chart. 
Melvyn B. Krauss introduced S-curve and di-curve on Chart-3 from Chart-2 of this 
paper4>. The spindle is defined by the comparative price of good-Y that is measured 
by good-X. Krauss explained that we can introduce not just a partial equilibrium demand-
supply-curve, but a general equilibrium demand-supply-curve in accordanc巴 withthis 
definition5l. However, his explanation indicat日sonly the relationship between demand 
and supply of one good, and the relations between this good and a different good is not 
clearly indic日tedin his explanation. Therefore, Chart-3 can not yet be defined as a 
general equilibrium chart. The spindle of a partial equilibrium chart is g巳nerallydefined 
by the price of good-Y. Krauss’s chart, in that senes, is a partial amendment of. partial 
equilibrium chart, but is stil essentially the same as a partial equilibrium chart. 
Furthermore, Chart-3 is intr・oducedto use the same method as a partial equilibrium. 
Krauss’s explanation using Chart-3 has some problems. First, he introduces S-curve 
(supply-curve of good-Y) of Chart-3 from HH-curve (production-frontier) of Chart-2. 
This is correct, b巴causeHH-curve (production-frontier) is given and there is only 
one-curve. Next, he intorduces di-curve (demand-curve for good-Y) of Chart-3 by 
rotating a comparative-pricεcurve parallel to the U0 curve (trade-indifference-curve). 
However, gains from trade can not be indicated by this method, because consumer-
welfar巴 hasnot increased on indifference curve U0 and the gain from trade is zero. 
Therefore, we need the follwing amendment to rectify Krauss’s explanation. First, we 
draw not only the demand-curve d1 of Chart-3 that is introduced by the indifference-
curve U。ofChart-2, but also the demand-curve d2 or d3 of Chart-3 that is introduced 
by the indiff巴rence-curveU1 or U2. Next, we draw D-curve that links di-curv巴， d2-
curve and d3-curve like Chart-36). This D-curve is the correct demand curve that 
involves an income-effect and a substitution-effect. 
Krauss’s mistake is due to the way he measures gains from trade. Krauss tends to 
measure gains from trade via a comp旦risonof producer’s surplus with producer’s 
surplus for one good. This method could be an adequate way to measure gains from 
trade making the gain more tangible. However, the basis of the analysis according to 
this method does not follow the essentials of trade theory based on comparative cost of 
production and relatiγe competition. Instead, the basis of the analysis is an analysis of 
one good based on absolute costs of production and absolute competition in a world 
without national borders. We should be free ourselves from these assumptions. 
According to the explanation using a partial equilibrium chart, imports of good-Y 
result in a gain in consumer’s surplus (indicated by ~a space APC" B) and loss in 
producer’s surplus (indicated by a space APP”B). Affirming the comparison between 
gain and loss, imports of good-Y introduce a net surplus. This conclusion offers an 
affirmative view of free trade. 
4〕MelvynB. Krauss, A Geometγic Approach to International Tγade, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 
1979. 
5〕ProfessorTaro Watanabe uses the same explanation in his article (Taro Watanabe, Koki← 
sai Keizai, 3rd-edition, Shun-Ju-Sha, 1980). 
6〕TakashiNegishi，βoeki Rieki to Kokusai Shushi, Sobun-sha Publishing, 1971. 
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A regular chart of partial equilibrium is used in this explanation. In this explanation, 
the producer’s surplus indicated by price is compared with a consumer’s surplus indicated 
by utility. However, price and utility are quite different, and this is an important 
problem. Generally speaking, equating the two is possible when the marginal utility of 
money is constant7>. However, the important problem, the essential difference between 
price and utility, is stil not solved. 
Furthermore, Krauss point邑outthat it is possible to compare price with utility under 
the assumption that consumers and producers are identical on his revised partial equili-
brium chart. However, a consumer of one good is actually different from a producer 
of the same good, and consumer’s surplus is quite different from producer’s surplus. 
Therefore, although free import increases an invisible surplus for the consumers, 
independent import industries suffer a visible los, and cons巴quently,th巴ywill strongly 
defend their profit against import. Their loss includes not only the producer’s surplus 
(indicated by a space APP’B), but also a decrease in the selling income (indicated by 
a space from APQ2 to BP’QiO). 
In order to persuade the assertions of anti-free trade from the production-side, we 
return to a general equilibrium approach in Chart-2 and attempt to correctly explain a 
partial equilibrium chart on Chart-3. First, as the S-curve (supply-curve) of Chart-3 
is introduced by a given production frontier of Chart-2, production factors that produced 
a volume of decrease in the selling income of importing good-Y as a whole could be 
reconverted to increase production of 位 portinggood同X without any gain or los. 
Therefore, th巴reis no reason for production-side to push for protected trade. This 
conclusion can be further clarified if we recall a pure exchange-model. In a pure-
exchange-model, because goods-in-stock is a given, and S (supply)-curve of Chart-3 is 
drawn as a perpendicular. According to this model, imports of good-Y decrease income 
accompanied by a decline of price in the production-side, but imports of good-Y do not 
produce any impact such as production reconversion. 
Second, a correct demand-curve is not di-curve, but D-curve, if we correctly derive 
it from a general equilibrium chart. This introduces a large consumer’s surplus( indicated 
by a space APCB), but we must deduct the volume of decr巴asingconsumer’s surplus 
on exporting good-X from this surplus. In addition, in term of exporting good-X, we 
can understand that the comparative price is higher than OA, with defining the spindle 
of Chart-3 as X and the axis of Chart-3 as Px/ Py. Thus, the inclination of D-curve 
will be more modest than that of di-curve, and accordingly, the volume of decrease 
of consumer’s surplus will be also smaller. Therefore, the increase of consumer’s 
surplus in import will always be greater_:than decrease in export. This net increase 
of consumer’s surplus indicates the elevation of indifference-curve from U0 to U1 as 
indicated in Chart-2. 
After al, if production adjustment is smoothly carried out on the productionιfrontier 
(also, in the case that there is no gain or loss in the production-side), consum巴rwelfare 
will always be increased. Therefore, there is no reason to argue against free trade. 
7〕S.Yamamoto, Boeki Seisaku no Riγon, Toyo Keizai Publishing, 197 4.
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Production adjustment is the most effective method and it is carried out in a long 
term. However, in the short term, in order to train employers and workers for new 
industries and renovate capital instruments, there are chances of coming difficulties, 
such as unemployment and unfavorable balance of trade. In such a situation, in order 
to maintain consumer welfare, we should not implement any policies that prevent free 
exchange and circulation. Instead, we should adopt industrial adjustment assistance 
policies, such as re-training for employers and workers and low interest rate financing, 
to directly support and promote production adjustment. Since these necessary production 
adjustment processes are very large in scale and radical, these processes raises issues 
related to the Safeguard Clause of GATT (section-19)8l. If it is an emergency and if 
the term of import restriction is expressed clearly, the adjustment policies are acceptable. 
However, at the same time, the country that opts to use Saf巴guardClause must also 
adopt progressive adjustment policies. 
2. Infant Industry Argument 
Theoretical Argument on I:ηfant Industry Policy 
8〕InSafeguard Clause (section-19) of General Agreemet on Tariffs and Trade, GATT Per-
mits member countries to adopt temporary import restriction until end of adjustment. 
46 立教経済学研究第46巻第4号 1993年
Policies of protection for the nurturing of infant industries are endorsed to a certain 
extent among many scholars9l. However, we must recognize that this infant industry 
argument and the free trade principle introduced from traditional trade theory belong 
to quite different dimensions ; the infant industry argument is an over-time dynamic 
trade expansive theory, and it is quite different frnm the static trade巴quilibriumtheory 
that was pr巴viouslystated. 
In this paper, the infant industry argument is explained as an expansive process of 
the production frontier as indicat巴din Chart 4. It is hypothesized here that one country 
places its primary production-frontier on the AB-curve in a system of given consumption 
indifferenc巴－curves,so that trade equilibrium is realized, terms of trade are defined 
by the inclination of XY-curve, and places its primary production point and consumptioロ
point at point-P0 and point-C0. In addition, good-Xis defined as export good and good-
Y is defined as import-good. 
Under this hypothesis, if the production-frontier is expanded by som巴 dynamicpower 
from the AB司 curveto the A’B’－curv巴andterms of trade are maintained at the same 
inclination (but shifted from XY-curve to X’Y'-curve), the production point shifts to 
P1 and consumption point shifts to C1. Based on this change, trade pattern of this model 
(country〕willchange and the nature of good-X and good-Y will go by contraries 
(good-X will pe an import good and good-Y will be an export good). Initiating these 
chang巴sis the policy goal of infant industry policies. Additional explanation follows. 
〔1〕 Dynamicpower towards the expansion of the production-frontier: 
Sεveral different scenarios are explored b巴low.〔a)There is the case that internal 
economies based on learning process come into existence in the firms manufacturing 
good『 Y10l.In this case, production-frontier shifts from AB to AB’（expansion of produ-
ction-frontier is inclining toward good-Y). (b) In the case that good-Y is more capital 
intensive that good-X, if capital accumulation rate is higher than the growth rate of 
labJur force, we come to the same conclusion as case-(a). However, point-A also shifts 
slightly toward the right-side in this case. (c) In the case where technological progress 
is accomplished only in the industries of good-Y, we reach the same conclusion as 
case-(a). (d) In the case that industries of good-Y receive foreign direct investment 
and more surpassing production-function are transplanted to those industries, this case 
reaches the same conclusion as case－〔a〕andcase-Cc〕．
(2〕 Argum日nton Vent-for-Surplus : 
The argum巴日there also coincides with an argument on the expansion on the production-
frontier.羽Thenthere is a lack of entrepreneurs, shortage of capital, technology and 
market, the potential of natural resources or the labour force lies idle and the production 
point remains inside the optimal production-frontier. In this case, if the factors in 
shortage are supplemented, it will be possible to shift the production point toward the 
optimal production-frontier. This is the typical case where development by foreign 
9) Herbert G. Grubel intoroduces infant industry and protected trade argument systematical-
ly in an article (Herbert G. Gruble, International Economics, Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1977〕
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firms is effective. 
(3〕 Inshort, the shift of the production point from the primary production-frontier 
to a newly e玄pansiveproduction-frontier, or from inside of the optimal production-
frontier to the optimal production-frontier, entails a not gain for the national economy 
and economic development. The forces motivating these shifts are original m凹nsof 
economic development, such as accumulation of capital, technological progress and activi-
ties of entrepreneurs (including learning process). Therefore, the protective measures 
for trade (exchange), such as tariffs, are fundamentally ineffectivem. It is indispensable 
for international relations that factors in shortage, such as capital, technology, and the 
ability of entrepreneurs and markets be complemented. Therefore, there emerges a new 
issue : international complement of national production processes. The main issues here 
are aid (assistance), foreign direct investments and technological transfer is also neces” 
sary to establish rules on these activities. 
Analysis with a Partial-Equilibrium-Chart 
The following is an analysis of the propriety of the infant industry argument with a 
partial equilibrium chart12>. In this analysis, a partial equilibrium demand-curve and 
some upward short-term supply-curves are drawn, and it is explained that positive 
producers’surplus, without protection (such as tariffs), accompanied by shifting these 
short-term supply-curve are introduced. In this explanation, it is attempted to introduce 
one of appreciations for or against infant industry arg山nent,by deducting the loss of 
consumers’surplus from over-time net amount of producers’surplus (converting and 
discounting each surplus into current value). Even if the entrepreneur suffers a primary 
loss due to costs higher than the world price, if their profit in the future exceeds their 
los, private firms will e玄pandtheir production and learn by themselves. Deriving from 
she fromer explanation, one of conclusion is the unnecessity of protection. This conclu-
tion requires as a precondition the existence of mature firms. In addition, there is no 
denying the fact that import restriction by tariffs is better for firms from expanding 
their production. However, we can not deny the fact that productive measures are not 
original means of production. 
3. Fair Trade Argument 
Fair Trade Argument is Negotiating Position 
The United States has advocated free trade strongly, criticized protective trade practices 
10) Shiro Yabushita，“Protection of the infant industry : A Note，” The Economic Recoγd, 
September 1975. 
11) If one c四 ntryuses tariffs in trade and does not us巴anym回 surefor econonic develop-
ment, this country can not attain more welfare than free trade. According to a general 
elucidation of static effect of tarifs, this conclusion is clear, 
12) Kiyoshi Kojima, Gaikoku Boeki, 5th-edition, Shun-Ju-Sha, 1981. 
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of trade partners and pr巴ssedpartner countries for trade liberalization. Since the end 
of the 1960s, the United States has begun to use a multivocal notion of“fair trade” 
and begun to criticize partner countries, especially Japan and NIEs countries with this 
notion13)14)15). However, this fair trade argument that the United States advocated seems 
to have been a building block for protected trade. 
The notion of fair trade is quite different from the traditional free trade argument 
and sometimes contradictory, the fair trade argument was introduced as a method for 
trade negotiation of the United States. It was linked with reciprocity,1刊行 whichwas a 
policy that the United States had traditionally used is trade negotiations. The United 
States has considered export as gain and import as loss in al trade negotiations (GATT 
negotiations and bilateral negotiations), and it has be巴nthe negotiation philosophy. This 
philosophy is quite contradictory to the traditional free trade argument, but it is an 
effective measure to demand trade liberalization of partner countries in trade negotiations. 
How色ver,recent trade problems have heightened to the extent that it is no longer 
enough to solely demand trade liberalization in other countries. Since international 
competitiveness and export promotion has increased in part江ercountries of the United 
States, foreign imports of the United States increased. Under such a situation, requesting 
open markets from partner countries will not be a solution. Therefore, the United States 
took a countermeasure to cope with such situation and introduced “fair trade”as a new 
strategy. According to this strategy, the United States criticizes trade partners as being 
unfair, and demands voluntary export restrictions. In this case, this strategy is a 
defensive reaction. This strategy involves an important and fundamental problem with 
the notion of “fairness”1s>i9J. In addition, this strategy reflects the decline of international 
13〕Fairtr・adelaw was introduced in the state of California in 1931. After that, almost of 
the stat巴sintroduced fair trade law, and some p町 tsof these fair trade laws became the 
Federal law. The original purpose of fair trade law was to maintain resale prices, but after 
that, quality stabilization was also added to the purpose of fair trade law. The United States 
has begun to apply fair trad巴lawto foreign countries since the end of 1960s (Roth Report 
on Future Tγade Policy, Submitted to the President on January 14, 1969). 
14) Stephen D. Krasn巴r，“TheTokyo Round : Particularistic Interests and Prospects for Stabi-
lity in the Global Trading System”， T勿ternational Studies Q叫dγteγly,Vol. 23, No. 4, Dec号m-
ber 1979. 
15) Shigeo Oka, "Shin Kokusai Code Seiritsu no Igi to Shin Code Taisei-ka no 3己kaiBoeki”， 
Economic Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan （巴d.),Tokyo Round ga Sekai Boeki 
Taisei to Waga Kuni no Boeki ni oyobosu Eikyo, 1980. 
16) Robert 0. Keohane differentiates between two types of reciprocity, specitic and diffuse. 
Specific reciprocity refers to the situation in which specific partners 己主chageitems of 
equivalent value in a strictly delimited sequence. Diffus巴 reciprocityinvolves conforming 
to generally accepted standards of behavior. What we refer to here as“reciprocity" is 
巴quivalentof Keohane’s“specific reciprocity”（Robert 0. Keohane, International Institution 
and State Poweγ：Essays zη International Relations Theory, Westview, 1989). 
17) Stephen D. Krasner has applied Keohane’s definitions to U. S.-Japan relations (Stephen 
D. Krasner，“Trad巴Conflictsand the Common Defense: The United States and Japan，” 
Political Scieπce Quaγterly, Vol. 101, No. 5, 1986〕．
18) John Rawls offers a theoretical approach to th巴conceptof“fairness”in his article CJ ohn 
Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Harvard University Pr巴SS,1971). 
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competitiveness of the United States. In order to increase exports, the United States 
needs to adopt progressive export promotion policies as well as this strategy. However, 
the United States must make these policies similar to fair trade. The fair trade argu-
ment of the United St旦tesis lost in a maze ; the United States has lost sight of a real 
solution. 
Relationshipβ＇etween the Fair Trade Argument and Reciprocity 
The United States, as a leader, reduced tariffs of developed countries and decreased 
some NTBs (including import restriction in quantity) through several GATT negotiations. 
In addition, the United States introduced the international code system at the Tokyo 
Round n巴gotiation20).
The GATT negotiation multiple and indifferent trade originally, but the United States 
introduced reciprocity into GATT negotiations. ~This reciprocity is a source of the fair 
trade argument. However, there is a problem, because reciprocity belongs to a quite 
different theoretical system from the traditional fr閃 tradeargument. 
According to our previous argument, the traditional free trade principle is based on 
a static consumption economic trade theory and indicates gains from import. Therefore, 
this argument advocates that one country abolishes its artificial impediments for import 
and realizes free trade without regard to the system of its partners. It is usually called 
"unilateralism.”However, reciprocity indicates that one country requ巴stsan equal 
system and situation from its partners. If the United States reduces its own tariffs, 
other countries will have to reduce their tariffs equally. ~In this case, it is said that 
reciprocity might be a effective measure to promote global trade liberalization21). At the 
same time, it is also said that the~ reciprocity position of the United States delayed 
GA TT negotiations22>. The establishment or reduction of tariffs depends on national 
interest. Therefore, a country that cannot offer equal concessions to the United States 
can not attend n巴gotiationsby itself and will look forward to gains from free-riding on 
the decid己dsystem after negotiation. Thus, the GA TT system was planned to switch 
into a clear-cut system at the Kennedy Round negotiation. In addition, reciprocity, such 
as an equalization of total value of trade and list of exceptions was also carried out, 
and th巴UnitedStates requested to introduce overall reciprocity for unmeasured NTBs 
on Kennedy Round negotiation. 
19〕TheRand Corporation offers an interesting argument on the empirical concept of“fairness” 
(Roger Benjamin, Loren Yager, Micheal Shrires and Mark Peterson [(ed.), The Fairness 
Debate in U. S.-Japan Economic Relations, RAND/R-4100“CUSJR, 1991〕．
20〕Stephen D. Krasner，“The Tokyo Round : Particularistic Interests and Prosp巴氾tsfor Stabi!i-
ty in the Global Trading System，” Inte門iationalStudies Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 4, Decemb釘
1979. 
21〕J.S. Goldst巴inand J. R. Fre巴man,Three-Way司St問 et: Strategic~ Reciprocity in World 
Politics, the University of Chicago Press, 1990. 
22) Harry G. Johnson, T:問 deNegotiation and the New Inteγnational Studies, Geneva and the 
Trade Policy Research Centre, London, September 1976. 
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Sharing of I悦portBurden 
It is important to understand that reciprocity is a bargaining measure of the United 
States to reduce trade impediments. Furthermore, is also more important that reciprocity 
is introduced by a quite different [thought or theory from the traditional free trade 
principle. Reciprocity consists of the following two ideas : (1) the increase of imports 
is a burden ; and (2) exports are a gain. These idea are quite different from the 
traditional free trade principle, and they might be called neo-mercantilism or employ-
ment-oriented policies. 
The idea that the increase of imports is a burden is opposed to traditional free trade 
principle and denies the value of free trade. If it is correct, the reason to demand 
open trade for partnere does not exist from the first place. The burden accompanied 
by, the increase of imports is expressed via temporal unemployment or aggravation of 
the terms of trad巴.However, these burdens are inevitable in the production-adjustment 
process accompanied by trade. Reciprocity requests to share these burdens of increasing 
imports equally. 
This claim from reciprocity is clearly unfounded and incorrectζFirstly, if increasing 
imports is a burden, to request open trade brings the same burden on partners and 
cannot be permitted. Secondly, even if increasing import brings temporal unemployment 
or aggravation of the terms of trade, to reduce import impediments and to adjust 
production (in order to get cheaper and more imports) introduces gains from trade. 
Equalization of Export Oρportunity 
It is impossible to justify the idea that regards export as a gain by a static consu骨
mption economic trade theory, but it is possible to justify the idea by a dynamic 
economic development theory. Increasing exports e玄pandsemployment and income (of 
production factors) over time. These, in themselves, are:Lvisible and tangible gains. 
These export margins can elevate consumer welfare. through expanding and cheaper 
imports, but we can count these export margins, in themselves, as independent national 
economic gams over ti立ie.
It is very important for the United States to establish the idea that exports as a gain. 
If it is established, the United States will be able to promote its own ~exports through 
criticizing the import restrictions of its trade partners and pressing for open trade. 
The United States can advoιate the equalization of export opportunities between trade 
partners and the United States. 
It was very effective for the Unit巴dStates to press for open trade with its trade 
partners using reciprocity until the middle of the 1960s. When the international competi-
tiveness of the United States was relatively strong, the reciprocally equal reduction of 
trade impediments was very advantageous for the United States and it played a role 
of progressive export expansion policies for the United States. In this sense, it is said 
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that the strong rules in free trade28>24>. 
The United States stil adopts reciprocity as a measure for trade negotiations. In 
fact, the reciprocal import liberalization and open market which the United States has 
pursued contributed to the expansion of the United States e玄portmarket at a certain 
・stage. However, this is a policy that depends on the cooperation of trade partners of 
the United States is not always so effective for the United States as a measure to 
promote import liberalization of its partners, and its role is very limited as an export 
promotion policy25人
Equalization of Inter叩 ＇.tionalCom petiti廿eConditionsα叫 DefensiveFaiγTγade 
The notion of fair trade has played an important role for the United States during 
period of its decline in international competitiveness. During this time, lthe United 
States changed the nature of the fair trade argument into a defensive nature and, at 
the same time, the United States expanded its sphere of application. It is important 
for the Unit巴dStates to understand how to restrict its imports and how to defend its 
domestic industries. However, the United States finds gains (its national interest) from 
free trade, the United States can not adopt measures of anti-free trade (=protected 
trade). As a result of such a situation, the United States adopts a (fair trade stance 
.and presses its trade partners on trade negotiations. There are three stages to the fair 
trade argument in the United States. 
(1) In the 1930s, many countries introduced new types of trade measures including 
import restraint in quantity as well as traditional measures represented by import 
tariffs. In addition, export promotion policies were also introduced. The appearance of 
this export competition introduced a new stage beyond traditional free trade in the 
world trading system. This new stage in the world trading system was a source of fair 
trade. The typical measure of export promotions was to dump the price of goods such 
.as exchange rates dumping and social dumping, in the 1930s26>. In traditional free trade 
theory, it is巴xplainedthat there is no reason for importers to criticize dumping, e玄cept
predatory dumping. However, in the fair trade argument, dumping is criticized as an 
九nfair”tradepractice. Indeed, dumping prevention and countervailing duties are 
instituted in GA TT rul巴sand the Federal trade act. 
Labor-intensive goods represented by textiles were exported in concentration from 
Japan and the NIEs to the European and American markets; after that, steel, electric 
goods and automobiles. These exports from Japan and NIEs countries were considered 
23〕SarnirAmin, Le developpement inegal : essal suγ les formatioπs sociales du capitalisme 
peripherique, Les Editions de Minuit, 1973. 
24) Arghiri Emmanuel, Unequal Exchange : A Study of the Impeγialism of Trade, Monthly 
Review Press, 1972. 
25) Tom Peters points out that American headlong rush to protectionism throughout the 1980s 
cost the America 1, 200 dollars per family per year (San Jose M町curyNews, January 27, 
1992〕．
26〕ShigeruFuji, Keizai Hatten to Boeki Seisaku, Kunimoto Shobo, 1958. 
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a factor in market disruptions by the European countries and the United States. The 
export promotion policies of Japan and NIEs countries were also called “unfair.” 
Therefore, the long-term agreement no textiles was concluded, and exporters, such as 
Japan and NIEs countries, were pressed into voluntary export restraints (VER)27) and 
an orderly marketing agreement by Europe and the United States. 
(2〕 Theterms of export competition consist of transfer costs, and exchange costs 
as well as prices of export goods. Therefore, the terms of export credit of Japan and the 
loan rate margin of multinational banks were called “unfair.”In addition, the Japanese 
government was criticized as“unfair”in sharing the burden of adjustment, because the 
Japanese government did not rapidly adjust its own international balance of payments 
through the liberalization of the exchange rate market and the control of total demand. 
(3) The argument escalated more irrationally and emotionally. Since the goods of 
the countries whose wages are unreasonably low, and whose labor conditions are 
malignant, cause unemployment in certain American industries and reduce the level 
of wages in the United States, it is claimed that the United States should defend 
its own industries against these unfair competitions This opinion is called the “pauper 
labor" argument, and it has been around for a long tim巴2s)29).The request from trade 
unions of the United States to establish a fair labor standard for foreign countries is 
very strong. Some Americans criticize Japan for its attributes : living conditions, 
“workaholic rabbit hutches，＇’ life-time employment system, Japan Inc. and free-riding 
on defense, among other things30)sD. 
In sum, the defensive fair trade argument indicates that the United States requests 
its trade partners to equalize their fundamental competitive conditions to the United 
States. Therefore, we can summarize the def巴nsivefair trade argument as an equaliza-
tion of international competitive conditions. 
J[. Integration 
Gains f ram Free Trade 
Accordind to previous argument, pure exchange is defined as a rearrangement of goods 
in stock. This definition dose not include changes in production. This model offers an 
27〕C.Fred Bergsten offered an inter巴stingargument on VER in his article (C. Fred Bergsten 
(ed.), On the Non-Equivalence of I制金0γtQuotas and Volu汎ta：γyExport Restγai也ts:To叩aγda 
New Tγade Policy, Th巴MaidenheadPap巴rs,Lexington Books, 1973. 
28) D. Greenaway and C. Milner, Protectionism Again・・・…？， Hobert Paper 84, The Institute 
of Economic Affairs, 1979. 
29〕EverettHag巴n，“AnEconomic Justification of Protection，” Quarterly Jouγnal of Economics,. 
November 1958. 
30〕TaskFoγce Report on United States-Japan Tγade, The Unit巴dStates House of Repr巴senta-
tives, Committe巴Print,January 2, 1979. 
31) United States-Japan T問 deRepoγt, The United States House of Representatives, Committee 
Print, September 5, 1980. 
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important conclusion to the debate over the essence of gains from trade. That is to say~ 
trade profit means consumer profit and the increasing of welfare through rearrangement 
of goods in stock. Consumer profit is provided through the import of cheaper and 
increased amount of foreign goods. In short, gains from trade can be explained as 
“gains from import”． 
When production adjustment accompanies the beginning of trade, more profit from 
trade is gained than the case of pure-exchange-model. However, production adjustment 
does not produce any profit for production-side, but only increases consumer-welfare. 
Therefore, al gains from trade reselt in“profit”on the consumption-side. In sum, 
traditional trade theory incorporates production adjustment and gives consid巴rationto・ 
the production-side, stil, this is essentially a日onsumptioneconomic trade theory.” 
Furthermore, as long as trade is indifferent to the production-side, free trade always. 
increases consumer-welfare, not only in case of pure exchange, but also in the case 
where production adjustment is included. The legitimacy of the free trade principle and 
its universal propriety are thus demonstrated. 
If production adjustment is smoothly carried out on the production-frontier (also, in 
th巴 casethat there is no gain or loss in the production-side), consumer welfare will 
always be increased. Therefore, there is no reason to argue against free trade. Produc-
tion adjustment is the most effective method and it is carried out in a long term. 
However, in the short term, in order to train employers and workers for new industries. 
and renovate capital instruments, there are chances of coming difficulties, such as 
unemployment and unfavorable balance of trade. In such a situation, in order te> 
maintain consumer welfare, we should not implement any policies that prevent free 
exchange and circulation. Instead, we should adopt industrial adjustment assistance 
policies, such as re-training for employers and work巴rsand low interest rate financing, 
to directly support and promote production adjustment. Since these necessary production 
adjustment processes are very large in scale and radical, these processes raises issues. 
related to the Safeguard Clause of GATT (section-19)32>. If it is an emergency and if 
the term of import restriction is expressed clearly, the adjustment policies are acceptable. 
However, at the same time, the country that opts to use Safeguard Clause must alse> 
adopt progressive adjustment policies. 
Free Trade and International Complement 
In addition, we should deal with the relationship between free trade principle and 
infant industry argument. Free trade is introduced as an institution to exchange produ白d
goods from the view of the static free trade principle, and protected trade is requested 
as a measure to expand the production-frontier (dynamic development of national 
production process) from the view of the infant industry argument. It is especially 
problematic that they (the static reduction of artificial impedimβnts and the dynamic 
development of national production processes) are mutually promotive or contradictory 
32) In Safeguard Clause (section-19) of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, GATT 
permits member countries to adopt temporary import restriction until end of adjustment. 
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to each other. 
In order to examine this problem, we will consider the follwing points. There is 
international complement that introduces and promotes dynamic development of every 
national production process, such as ~a construction .of infr部tructurethrough foreign 
direct investment, technological transfer and aid. If this international complement expands 
and strengthens potentially comparatively advantageous industries, differences of compa-
rative cost of production will be expanded. Futhermore, free and harmonized trade will 
be introduced. If this hypothesis is correct, international complement (introduced by 
infant industry argument) will promote structural adjustment and the economic develop-
ment of the two countries with no contradiction of the free-trade-principle. 
D巴γelopingeconomies should promote development and growth of industries which 
possess possibilities for comparative advantage based on their stag巴ofeconomic d巴velop-
ment. It is better for developing economies to abide by this rule, like product cycle 
industrial development, in their industrialization. However, it does not nec巴ssarilyfollow 
that developing economies will abopt these desirable development policies. In such 
cases, investor countries should offer guidance to them in order to achieve desirable 
international complement. In this sense, rules for・ international complement as well as 
foreign direct investment are keenly required, but these rules have never been establi・
shed. In addition, most investment works substitutively, not complementarily, for trade. 
Industries of the Unit巴dStates are the prime examples33l. Foreign direct investment 
by American firms caused the deindustrialization of the American economy and became 
a source of protectionism. Therefore, these foreign direct investments are contradictory 
to the notion of a national economy. 
International economic relations are becoming intimate, and activities of firms disregard 
national borders. However, in r巴ality,sovereignty is maintained and national borders 
:have not disappeared. Therefore, economic development must be pursued within the 
framework of th巳 nationaleconomy, and international economic relations should be stil 
<:onsidered within the framework of relative competition and international division of 
labour based on comparati＼ァecost of production. International complement is a marginal 
part of national economic development, and international complement should be pursued 
accompanied by over-time comparative cost of production. 
The Fair Trade Argument is not a Trade Theory 
Th巴reare several fundamental criticisms against the fair trade argument. Firstly, 
the fair trade argument regards American competitive conditions, such as production, 
business and trade union, to be the best condition, and the fair trade argument requests 
that the trade partners of the United States incorporate American ways of competitive 
ctonditions; However, this argument is not reasonable and lacks foundation. 
Secondly, both mutual liberalization policies of trade for the export promotion of the 
• 33) Foreign direct investm巴ntof the United States has taken place in the industries of highest 
comparatjve advantage, such as high-technology industries (Kimio Takanaka, Talwkuseki 
Kigyo Ron, Tanizawa Shobo publishing Co., 1991〕．
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United States and equalization policies of international competitive conditions of trade 
partners to the United States depend on the reactions of trade partners. In addition, 
since the United States has never defined the notion of “fairness，” the United States 
-cannot look forward to good results from these requests. This is because it is correct 
that exporters have reduced their production and exchange costs, and that these reducti-
<:ms of costs promote a free trade system. That is affirmed by traditional free trade 
principle. 
Thirdly, the United States may try to drive its own policies, such as strengthening 
-0£ its international competitiveness and export promotion, but th巴sepolicies have been 
<lespis巴d.If the United States adopts these [policies, it will indicate that the United 
States will adopt the policies that the United States criticizes as“unfair.”In this 
sense, the fair trade argument involves a self-contradiction. 
Fourthly, the requests based on the fair trade argument, such as equalization of 
export opportunities and equalization of international competitive conditions, cannot be 
realized in a present international system that has national borders. Therefore, fair 
trade can only be realized within a single national economy, where (1) free movement 
・Of al production factors, (2) uniformity of the public sector, (3) homogeneity of value 
systems, (4) absolute comparison of production costs is possible, and where absolute 
-competition takes place. 
The differ巴neebetween a customs union, such as European Community (EC) and a 
free trade zone is that the former requires an equalization of the terms of competition 
vis-a-vis areas outside of the region (whereas in a free trade zone where national 
borders cease to exist, this is no longer an issue). However, such equalization is 
difficult even in the EC. 
The international division of labor or trade is implemented and is profitable only 
because comparative advantages arise from the differences ;in the term of production 
and/or terms of competition. Fair trade, however, is not based on such gains. We should 
-0nce again return to the principle of free trade principle and the principle of dynamic 
international complement (factor flows). 
Conclusion 
Based on the previous arguments in this paper, I can introduce the following conclu-
SlOllS. 
(1) Free trade is desirable for the exchange and/or distribution of produced goods, 
because free trade always increases consumer welfare. This is a true free trade princi-
ple that is introduced by traditional static trade theory. 
(2) The beginning and/or continuing of trade increases imports and introduces some 
kind of friction, such as unemployment. Therefore, we need production adjustments. 
However, even with a loss from free trade, it is incorrect to advocate protected trade. 
Under this situation, we should promote and finish production adjustment in order to 
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realize full-employment and optimal allocation of production factors. 
(3) The idea presented by infant industry argument belongs to the dynamic indu-
strial trade theory that is quite different from a static consumption economic free trade 
theory. It explains that expanding the production frontier by the activities of entre-
preneurs and original means of development capabilities, such as capital accumulation 
and technological advance, always introduces national economic gains and leads infant 
industries to export industries. 
( 4) In the process of expanding the production-frontier, while temporal protection 
against foreign competition is promotive for the process, but protection is not essential 
and effective for the process. Because what is needed is not a protection, but an 
original means of development capability. If some of the capabilities are deficient, 
making up for the deficient factors by foreign direct investment and technological 
transfer is more effective measure of the infant industries encoはragepolicy and 
economic development policy. 
(5) If international supplement is put into practice in accordance with potential 
patterns of comparative advantage, international supplement will not be contradictory to 
free trade and international complement and free trade will mutually realize the 
hamonious development of a global economy. Therefore, it is very important for us to 
study the international supplement argument theoretically. 
(6) Fair trade that the United States advocates is only a measure for trade negotiations, 
and it is impossible to justify fair trade theoretically. When the competitiveness of the 
United States was strong, the United States requested trade liberalization for the other 
countries and pressed for the equalization of e玄portopportunities. However, when the 
cometitiveness of the United States has been relatively weak, the United States has 
requested the equalization of international competitive conditions according to its own 
condition. This can be termed a“defensive fair trade.”The policies that are essentially 
needed for present stage of the United States are to strengthen its own international 
cometitiveness and export promotion. However, if these policies are adopted, the logic 
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